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Abstract
This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of
populist and anti-European Union (EU) politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional
second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena
for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives.
It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data
from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations.
Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by
electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more
pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We
find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euro-
skepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have
moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among
populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party
ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly
explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents.
Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often
associated with EP elections.
Key words: Elections; European Union; populism; right-wing extremism; voting behavior
Introduction
The rise of populism has arguably been one of the most important developments in European
politics over the last two decades. Defined as a set of ideas that emphasizes antagonism between
the people and the elite and privileges the will of the people, populism is a thin ideology embraced
by diverse political actors across the political spectrum (Mudde, 2004; Mueller, 2016). Since the
turn of the century, electoral support for populist parties in Europe has more than tripled, and the
number of Europeans who live in a country that has a populist party in government increased
tenfold between 1998 and 2018 (Lewis et al., 2018). While the success of populist actors is linked
to the multiple crises that have shaken European politics (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015), it is also
attributed to broad structural changes in European societies (Betz, 1994; Mair 2013; Norris
and Inglehart, 2019). This implies that populism may be the new normal, as opposed to a tem-
porary crisis-induced deviation from liberal democracy.
The populist tide has not spared European Union (EU) politics. Because of the symbiotic rela-
tionship between populism and euroskepticism (Rooduijn and van Kessel, 2019), the rise of
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populist parties has the potential to undermine the European integration project. The 2014 elec-
tions to the European Parliament (EP) constituted a ‘great leap forward’ for the populists who
won a quarter of all seats (Luo, 2017; Martín-Cubas et al., 2019) while traditional liberal, conser-
vative and social-democratic parties suffered losses. The astonishing success of euroskeptics in
these elections lent support to the argument that European integration has become politicized,
constituting an important new divide in European societies (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Kriesi,
2016). In the 2019 European contests, populists and euroskeptics largely held the ground gained
in 2014. The European Parliament became more fragmented than ever before, with the two lar-
gest political groups for the first time controlling less than half of the seats. However, populist
performance varied by ideology. While right-wing populists made marked gains, including in
the large member states such as Italy, France and the UK, left-wing populists registered significant
losses (Mudde, 2019). The dynamics of electoral support for populist, euroskeptic and extremist
groups also varied greatly across member states. Thus, the picture that emerges from the 2019
elections is one of complexity and fragmentation (Bolin et al., 2019).
These developments have intensified debates about what EP elections are and how they work
(van der Brug et al., 2016; Nielsen and Franklin, 2017; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2019). The con-
ventional understanding is that EP elections are second-order national contests that revolve
around national political concerns (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This view is challenged by the
large and diverse literature on the salience of European integration and the prevalence of EU
issue voting (e.g. Carrubba and Timpone, 2005; Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; van
Elsas et al., 2019; Angelucci et al., 2020), as well as theoretical contributions emphasizing the pol-
iticization of European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Kriesi, 2016). More recently, the
rise of populism, extremism and euroskepticism has been regarded as a death bell to the permis-
sive consensus that characterized European integration for many decades. In this context, a
re-assessment of existing theoretical models of EP elections is in order.
This article seeks to enhance our understanding of EP elections in the era of populist and
anti-EU politics. Specifically, we aim to evaluate both the familiar second-order theory and a
rival view that regards EP elections as an independent, EU-wide arena for contestation between
antagonistic political ideas in light of evidence from the most recent EP elections. We derive
empirical predictions from both approaches and test these with party-level data from all 28
EU member states in the context of the 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explana-
tions. While we find no systematic evidence of voters punishing political incumbents, party
size emerges as a consistent negative predictor of electoral performance in EP elections relative
to preceding national elections. The effect of party size is moderated by the institutional setting:
large party losses are more pronounced in countries that use plurality or mixed electoral systems
in national elections compared to countries that use proportional representation in both national
and EP elections. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically pre-
dict performance in EP elections but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of
incumbency and party size.
Second-order effects or ideational rifts?
Does the second-order elections theory that was developed in response to the first direct elections
to the EP in 1979 still apply four decades later? Much has changed in the realm of European inte-
gration, as well as in party politics. With a societal consensus on the desirability of European inte-
gration now an increasingly distant memory, and liberal democracy under attack by various
challengers, have EP elections become an independent arena on which the battle between liberal-
democratic Europeanism and opposing ideologies is fought out? This section revisits the familiar
second-order thesis before outlining an alternative explanation of electoral outcomes that focuses
on ideational party characteristics.
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Second-order national elections
The second-order national elections thesis, formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980), has domi-
nated the literature on EP elections for nearly four decades. The theory argues that because EP
elections do not lead to government formation at the national level, they are viewed as less
important by voters, parties and the media. The main symptom of the lesser importance of
these elections is low turnout. Furthermore, these elections are national, not European: they
are simultaneous nationally-organized contests between national parties, revolving around
domestic issues and cleavages. When EP elections produce results that differ from those of first-
order elections, this happens because EP elections take place in different phases of the first-order
election cycle and because the lesser importance of these elections has implications for the behav-
ior of both voters and parties.
A key behavioral implication of the second-order setting is that voters are less likely to act
strategically, i.e. they are less concerned with the expected value of the election outcome.
Thus, second-order elections are associated with an increased prevalence of sincere and protest
voting – voters are more likely to vote with the ‘heart’ and the ‘boot’ than with the ‘head’
(Oppenhuis et al., 1996). Sincere voting means ‘supporting parties less relevant to government
formation but closer to the voters’ ideal positions’ (Hix and Marsh, 2007, p. 497). While a closer
correspondence of the vote to the true preferences of citizens may be considered desirable from
the perspective of democracy, the SOE approach associates sincere voting with affective behavior
which translates into electoral gains for small and fringe parties, and losses for large mainstream
parties. Protest voting means that voters use their vote to send signals to political incumbents
(Hix and Marsh, 2007). This means withholding support from government parties, either by
abstention or by switching vote to the opposition. Because dissatisfaction with governments
tends to build over time, the performance of political incumbents depends on the phase of the
first-order election cycle (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif 1984). Incumbent losses are expected to
be most pronounced in the middle of the national electoral cycle, as opposed to soon after or
immediately preceding first-order elections.
In sum, second-order national elections are associated with a clear set of aggregate-level symp-
toms, including low turnout, electoral losses of government parties and large parties, electoral gains
of opposition parties and small parties, and variation in the magnitude of incumbent losses depend-
ing on the phase of the electoral cycle. The predictions of the SOE model have been extensively and
systematically tested, and mostly corroborated, with aggregate EP election data spanning four dec-
ades (e.g. Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998; Schmitt, 2005, Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011; Schmitt
and Toygür, 2016). Individual-level studies that confirm voters’ pre-occupation with national issues
and concerns, as well as proclivity to punish political incumbents, lend additional support to the
SOE thesis (e.g. Schmitt et al., 2008; Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009; Hobolt and Wittrock, 2011).
Altogether, the SOE model yields the following predictions about the drivers of aggregate out-
comes in European elections:
Hypothesis 1: Government parties lose votes compared to preceding national elections
(‘incumbent losses’);
Hypothesis 2: Large parties lose votes compared to preceding national elections (‘large party losses’);
Hypothesis 3: Electoral losses of government parties are more pronounced when EP elections
occur in the middle of the first-order electoral cycle (‘cycle effects’).
Responding to recent calls to pay more attention to possible electoral system effects in the
study of voting behavior in EP elections (Farrell and Scully, 2005; Prosser, 2016), we add an add-
itional expectation that the effect of party size on vote gains or losses is modified by the type of
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electoral system used in national elections. While EP elections are held under a system of propor-
tional representation (PR), some EU member states use non-PR systems, including plurality,
two-round or mixed systems in national elections. Because plurality or mixed systems may
prompt voters to strategically vote for larger parties or disincentivize small parties to form or
run (Duverger, 1954; Blais and Carty, 1991), a fair comparison between vote shares at national
and EU elections should take into account whether national and EP elections are held under
broadly similar rules (PR) or not. Thus, we include the following auxiliary hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: The negative effect of party size on electoral performance in EP elections, relative
to preceding national elections, is stronger in countries where national legislatures are elected
under a plurality or mixed system compared to countries that use PR in both elections (‘electoral
system effects’).
Finally, in line with our focus on evaluating theories in the context of allegedly growing ideo-
logical contestation, we include the expectation that the effects of the SOE variables are stable
across party ideologies:
Hypothesis 4: Effects in Hypotheses 1–3 do not vary across ideational party characteristics such
as populism, extremism and euroskepticism (‘SOE effects stable across party ideology’).
EP elections as a sui generis arena for political contestation
Recent developments in European integration have cast serious doubts on the continued validity
of the argument that EP elections are merely an additional, secondary arena for domestic political
contestation. With the expansion of EU powers and policy responsibilities, the permissive con-
sensus (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) that characterized public attitudes towards European
integration for decades has been replaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks,
2009). Public attitudes towards the EU have become increasingly well defined as well as polarized,
and political entrepreneurs keen to profit from popular dissent have deliberately cultivated con-
flict over Europe, linking it to pre-existing political cleavages and framing integration in ways they
consider electorally advantageous (Kriesi, 2016; Braun, Popa, and Schmitt, 2019). As a result,
European integration has become politicized: it constitutes a new political divide that structures
public opinion and party competition, shaping voting behavior in elections and referenda (Hix,
1999; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Kriesi, 2007, 2016; Hobolt, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2009).
The numerous challenges that Europeans have experienced over the past decade, including the
eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorism, geopolitical tensions and Brexit, have served as cat-
alysts for the politicization of integration (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). In
sum, while the EU could be seen as a ‘polity without politics’ in the past (Schmidt, 2006), many
scholars believe that such a characterization is no longer justified.
Both the extent and the structure of political conflict over Europe have been extensively
debated. In particular, the discussion has focused on how the pro-and anti-EU divide is related
to the conventional left-right divide (Hix, 1994; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004), as well as to the
Green-Alternative-Libertarian and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL-TAN) axis
(Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2006). The relationship between the EU divide and other pol-
itical cleavages appears to vary greatly across regions, individual member states and time (Hooghe
and Marks, 2009). This is the case because the politicization of European integration is embedded
in diverse national political conflict structures and driven by diverging experiences of the member
states with recent crises (Kriesi, 2007, 2016). However, broadly speaking, euroskepticism has a
symbiotic relationship with extremism of both the far-right and the far-left variety, as well as
with populism (e.g. Rooduijn and van Kessel, 2019).
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The question of what the politicization of European integration implies for second-order elec-
tions theory requires careful consideration. While the politicization argument challenges the view
that European issues do not matter to voters, it does not refute the primacy of the first-order
arena or the notion that EP elections simply mirror first-order dynamics. As pointed out by
Kriesi (2016, 32), national politics are the crucial arena for the politicization of European integra-
tion due to the ‘weakness of the partisan channel of representation at the European level’. Political
entrepreneurs who see electoral advantages in politicizing integration will focus their efforts,
above all, on the national level. Politicization, thus, means incorporating the issue of European
integration into national politics but does not suggest that EP contests become important in
their own right.
A more fundamental challenge to the SOE theory would assert that EP elections constitute a
sui generis arena for political contestation. Such an assertion calls for demonstrating that aggre-
gate outcomes of EP elections cannot be reduced to a combination of party performance in first-
order elections and the erosion of incumbent support as a function of ‘political time’. On the
party level, this would mean that party gains and losses in EP elections relative to preceding
national elections vary as a function of ideology, programmatic differences or policy positions,
or reflect pan-European political dynamics. On the individual level, vote should be driven by atti-
tudes towards European integration, support for EU institutions, or positions on EU issues, rather
than evaluations of the national government or other domestic preferences. Given the recent
importance of European issues at the national level it might be hard to demonstrate that EP elec-
tions that evince conflict over Europe are not simply showing their SOE character at a time of
national politicization of European issues.
Still, existing studies lend some support to these expectations. The extensive literature on EU
issue voting suggests that EU attitudes are an important determinant of vote choice in EP elec-
tions (Carrubba and Timpone, 2005; van Spanje and de Vreese, 2011; Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and
de Vries, 2016; van Elsas et al., 2019). Issue voting in EP elections is enhanced by political cam-
paigns that inform and persuade voters about candidates, policies and performance (Beach et al.,
2018), as well as by the availability of information on European integration (Hobolt and Wittrock,
2011). Thus, information and campaigns make EP elections less second-order, enabling voters to
become more aware of their own and the parties’ EU attitudes and rely on these attitudes as
opposed to national heuristics (Beach et al., 2018).1
On the aggregate level, attempts to identify ‘European effects’ in EP elections distinct from
second-order effects have focused on pan-European shifts in the behavior of voters towards or
away from particular party families (Hix and Marsh, 2011). The argument is that comparatively
strong or poor performance of a particular party family in EP elections, independent from gov-
ernment status and size, would occur as the result of European-wide policy preferences at a par-
ticular time point, or because voters hold one level of government more responsible for the given
area than the other (Hix and Marsh, 2011, 10). Analyzing aggregate data from seven EP elections,
Hix and Marsh identify several such pan-European swings – e.g. for green parties, away from
socialist parties – and argue that such reactions to common policy concerns could be regarded
as ‘the first step in the evolution of European Parliament elections into genuine
European-wide votes about the direction of the EU policy agenda’ (ibid.).
Our analysis builds on Hix and Marsh (2011) in focusing on ideational party characteristics
and the differential performance of party families across different types of elections. Instead of
conventional party families, we focus on what is arguably the most prominent ideological fault
1Alternatively, those who first defined the nature of second-order effects may simply have failed to notice a component of
SOE behavior that arises from the location of EP elections within the national election cycle. Weber and Franklin (2018)
recently established that issues become more important with increasing distance from national elections and scholars may
only recently have started to notice concomitants of this phenomenon for SOE behavior. Thus, a critical component of
this article’s approach is to look for issue effects that are independent of political time.
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line in current European politics – the clash between liberal democratic Europeanism, on the one
hand, and a populist-nationalist-sovereignist opposition that seeks to restore autonomy, identity
and control, on the other. Building on the notion of pan-European swings, we argue that system-
atic EU-wide electoral gains or losses of populists, extremists and euroskeptics in EP elections,
controlling for government status, party size and electoral cycle effects, would challenge the
second-order elections theory, while lending tentative support to the argument that EP elections
are, at least partly, a sui generis political arena.2 In sum, the argument about the importance of
ideational rifts yields the following predictions about aggregate outcomes in European elections:
Hypothesis 5: In comparison to other parties, Euroskeptic parties gain or lose significantly more
votes in EP elections compared to preceding national elections (‘euroskeptic gains/losses’);
Hypothesis 6a: In comparison to other parties, far-right parties gain or lose significantly more
votes in EP elections compared to preceding national elections (‘far-right gains/losses’);
Hypothesis 6b: In comparison to other parties, far-left parties gain or lose significantly more
votes in EP elections compared to preceding national elections (‘far-left gains/losses’);
Hypothesis 7: In comparison to other parties, populist parties gain or lose significantly more
votes in EP elections compared to preceding national elections (‘populist gains/losses’).
In order to rule out any confounding of ideational effects with second-order effects, we also
posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 8: Effects in Hypotheses 5–7 do not vary across incumbency, party size and the phase
of the electoral cycle. (‘Ideological effects stable over SOE variables’).
Data and methods
We constructed a database covering all parties and electoral alliances in 28 EU member states that
(a) competed in both the 2019 EP election as well as the preceding national parliamentary election
and (b) obtained at least 2% of the vote in the national election. Because our dependent variable is
defined as difference in vote shares obtained in EP and national election, parties that competed in
only one election but not the other were dropped from the analysis. Cases involving membership in
electoral alliances were examined one-by-one to determine if the case can be meaningfully
included in the analysis or must be coded as missing. When parties competed separately in one
election and as part of an alliance in the other election, vote shares of individual parties were
added to calculate the vote difference. However, cases with complex shifts of alliance membership
had to be dropped from the analysis because it was not possible to calculate the dependent variable.
The final number of parties and electoral alliances included in the analysis is 192.
The dependent variable, difference in vote shares, is calculated by deducting the vote share
obtained by the party in national elections from its vote share in the 2019 EP election.
Information about parties’ electoral performance is obtained from the ParlGov database
(Döring and Manow, 2019) which covers all EU and most OECD democracies. On average,
2A possible objection to this argument is that the gains or losses of populists, extremists and euroskeptics in EP elections,
relative to national elections, could be due to a ‘time effect’ – i.e. some development or event that occurs before EP elections
that sparks a vote for these parties (which would also have been expressed on a different electoral arena had it been available).
While this is valid point that deserves to be examined further with data spanning multiple rounds of national and EP elec-
tions, we note that the idea of systematic EU-wide vote swings in response to some development or event are not consistent
with the original SOE depiction of EP elections as a predominantly ‘national affair.’
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the parties included in our analysis lost 0.8 percentage points of the vote compared to preceding
national elections: the values of the variable range from −33.4 (the Conservative Party in the UK)
to +19.5 (Unity in Latvia).
The analysis employs separate dummy variables for populist, far-right, far-left and euroskeptic
parties, as well as a general populist-extremist-euroskeptic (PEES) dummy for parties that belong
to at least one of these categories. Our classification is based on the PopuList database, a resource
providing an overview of populist, far-right, far-left and eurosceptic parties in Europe (Rooduijn
et al., 2019). This classification of parties is based on widely-accepted definitions developed by
leading experts in the field. Thus, populism is defined as an endorsement of the idea that society
is separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite’ and that politics should be an expression of the ‘general will’ of the people (Mudde,
2004). The definition of far-right parties combines a subscription to a nativist ideology that
regards nonnative elements as fundamentally threatening with an endorsement of authoritarian-
ism, defined as a belief in a strictly ordered society (Mudde, 2007). The definition of far-left
employed by the PopuList builds on March (2012) and includes parties that reject capitalism
and advocate alternative economic and power structures as well as redistribution of resources
from existing political elites. Finally, consistently with Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004), euroskepti-
cism is defined as entailing both the soft and hard varieties, i.e. including parties that express
either contingent or qualified opposition or outright and unqualified opposition to the process
of European integration (see Rooduijn et al 2019). The coding of parties in the PopuList has
been peer-reviewed by more than 30 academics. The PopuList is supported by the Amsterdam
Institute for Social Science Research, The Guardian and the ECPR Standing Group on
Extremism and Democracy.
Based on the PopuList data, out of the 192 parties considered, we classify 41 parties as popu-
list, 23 as far-right, 22 as far-left and 52 as euroskeptic. The categories partially overlap: several
parties are simultaneously extremist, populist and anti-EU (the implications of this overlap for
our regression analysis will be explained below). Among all EU member states, Italy and
Slovakia had the largest number of populist parties (4), while Poland and Slovakia ranked first
in terms of the number of parties (3) classified as far-right. While most EU countries had one
far-left party, Denmark, France, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal had two. The Netherlands and
Slovakia led the list in terms of the number of euroskeptic parties (4). Based on vote shares in
EP elections, the top three PEES parties or alliances in the EU were Fidesz-Christian
Democratic People’s Party (Hungary) with 52.6% of the vote, Law and Justice (Poland) with
45.4% of the vote and the Northern League (Italy) with 34.3% of the vote. All three are classified
as populist, far-right and euroskeptic. The three far-left parties in the sample with the highest vote
share include the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus (27.5%), Syriza in Greece
(23.8%) and the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark (13.2%).
We include in the analysis a dichotomous variable for incumbency, coded as 1 for parties that
belonged to the national government at the time of the 2019 EP elections, and as 0 otherwise. The
coding is based on information available in the ParlGov database. Of the 192 parties included in
the analysis, 59 (30.7%) were in government at the time of EP elections. Of the 41 populist parties
in our sample, 12 were in government. Of the 23 far-right parties, 6 were political incumbents.
Only one far-left party (out of 22) was in government, while 9 out of the 52 euroskeptic parties
held executive power.
We follow previous studies (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2007) in using vote share in national elections
as a proxy for party size. The variable ranges from 2% to 55%, with a mean value of 13.1%. In
order to test the hypothesis that the effect of party size on vote difference is moderated by the
electoral system, we include a dummy variable that is coded 1 for countries that used proportional
representation in preceding national elections and 0 for countries where national elections were
held under a plurality or mixed system (UK, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania).
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Finally, we include a variable for the electoral cycle, operationalized as the percentage of the
first-order electoral cycle completed by the time of the 2019 EP elections. The observed values
of the variable range from 1.9% in Spain to 100% in Belgium, with a mean value of 48.5%.3
Because the expected effect of the electoral cycle on party performance is curvilinear, we follow
previous studies (e.g. Marsh 1998) in adding the square of the variable to our equations.
To test our hypotheses, we regress the difference in party vote share in EP and preceding
national elections on populism, right-wing and left-wing extremism, euroskepticism, party size,
incumbency, electoral system, electoral cycle, electoral cycle squared and a number of interaction
terms. To account for the nested structure of our data, we estimate multi-level regression models
with parties (192) nested in countries (28).
Results
The results of the multi-level regression models are reported in Table 1. The first model includes
the variables central to the SOE theory: incumbency, party size, the two measures of electoral
cycle and an interaction term that isolates cycle effects for parties in government. It also includes
the dummy for PR systems and an interaction term between party size and the electoral system.
To confirm the SOE theory, we would need to find statistically significant negative incumbency
and size effects, as well as a U-shaped effect of the electoral cycle on the electoral performance of
government parties. These expectations are only partly confirmed in Model 1 in Table 1. As
expected in Hypothesis 2, party size has a statistically significant negative effect on the dependent
variable, suggesting that the higher a party’s vote share in national elections, the greater its losses
in EP elections. Predictive margins (Table A1 in Appendix) indicate that the smallest party in the
sample has a likelihood of increasing its vote share by 2.1 percentage points from one election to
another, while the largest party is likely to lose 11.5 percentage points. The interaction term for
party size and the national electoral system has a statistically significant effect, confirming the
expectation (Hypothesis 2a) that large parties suffer less in countries where national elections
are held under proportional rule (Figure 1). Predicted vote difference (Table A1 in Appendix)
varies from 1.8 percentage points for the smallest party to −9.6 for the largest party in countries
that use PR in both national and EP elections, while the variation is much larger (from 3.3 to
−20.5 percentage points) in countries where national elections are conducted under a plurality
or mixed system. To account for the possibility that party size effect could be at least partly mech-
anical, considering that larger parties have a greater range of possible negative values in the
dependent variable than smaller parties, we conduct an additional robustness check, running
the model with a relative, as opposed to the absolute percentage change in vote shares as the
dependent variable. The results show that party size remains a consistent predictor of electoral
performance across different model specifications (Table 1b in Online Appendix).
Aside from party size effects, key expectations associated with the SOE model are not sup-
ported by the results of our analysis. The results in Model 1 in Table 1 suggest that incumbency
and electoral cycle were not statistically significant predictors of the difference in party perform-
ance between the 2019 EP elections and preceding national elections. This does not allow us to
confirm Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3. These findings challenge the SOE expectation that voters
use EP elections to send signals to parties in government while corroborating the argument that
in EP elections, voters abandon large parties in favor of small and marginal political actors.
Turning to the proposition that party performance in EP elections, relative to preceding
national elections, varies as a function of party ideology, we begin by examining descriptive
results. The average vote share of PEES parties in the 2019 EP contests was 2.3 percentage points
lower than in the preceding national election. The electoral performance on non-PEES parties, at
3All key findings remain robust when we repeat the analysis with the value for Belgium, which held national and EP elec-
tions at the same day, coded as 0 instead of 100.
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the same time, remained virtually unchanged at −0.1 percentage points. Populist parties saw their
vote share drop by 2.9 percentage points on average – from 15.6% of votes in national to 12.7% in
EP elections. In total, 33 out of the 41 parties were classified as populist in our sample lost votes
between the two elections, with the Italian Five Star Movement losing and the North League win-
ning the most (−16.2 and +16.9 percentage points, respectively). With an average vote share of
12.9% in national and 10.7% in EP elections, euroskeptic parties lost 2.2 percentage points from
one election to another. The largest losses in this group fell upon the Conservatives in the UK and
the largest gains on the North League in Italy (−33.4 and +16.9 percentage points, respectively).
Among extremists, far-left parties did worse than the far-right. The former lost 1.7 percentage
points of the vote (from 9.9 in national to 8.2% in EP elections). The largest decrease occurred
for SYRIZA in Greece and the largest increase for the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark (−11.7
and + 9 percentage points, respectively). The far-right mostly held its ground, as its losses
amounted to only 0.8 percentage points (from 14.9% of the vote in national to 14.1% in EP elec-
tions). The heaviest losses were suffered by Jobbik in Hungary while the biggest winner was the
Italian North League (−12.8 and +16.9 percentage points, respectively). In sum, descriptive
results show that PEES parties performed worse in EP elections than in national elections. The
fact that many PEES parties were also large government parties, however, highlights the need
for multivariate analysis.
We continue our exploration of the effects of party ideology by estimating a series of regression
models that control for the effects of incumbency, party size and the electoral cycle. As populism,
extremism and euroskepticism often coincide at the party level, our four measures of party ideology
cannot be included in the same model. Instead, we report the results of four models, each including
Table 1. Effects of party characteristics, electoral system and the electoral cycle on party performance in 2019 EP elections
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Incumbent 3.60
(2.43)
3.60
(2.41)
3.55
(2.42)
3.24
(2.42)
3.49
(2.41)
Party size −0.45***
(0.08)
−0.44***
(0.08)
−0.46***
(0.08)
−0.45***
(0.08)
−0.42***
(0.08)
Cycle 0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.00
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
Cycle2 −0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent # Cycle −0.16
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
−0.15
(0.11)
−0.15
(0.11)
−0.17
(0.11)
Incumbent # Cycle2 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
PR system −2.02
(1.69)
−2.12
(1.68)
−2.07
(1.69)
−2.01
(1.68)
−1.74
(1.69)
Party size # PR system 0.23**
(0.09)
0.23**
(0.09)
0.24***
(0.09)
0.24***
(0.09)
0.21**
(0.09)
Populist – −1.64
(1.00)
– – –
Far-right – – 0.97
(1.26)
– –
Far-left – – – −2.09
(1.30)
–
Euroskeptic – – – – −1.60
(0.94)
Constant 4.30**
(2.13)
4.48**
(2.12)
4.30**
(2.12)
4.68**
(2.13)
4.35**
(2.11)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192
Groups 28 28 28 28 28
Log Likelihood −603.7 −602.4 −603.4 −602.4 −602.3
Notes: Entries are coefficients from multi-level regression models with standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10.
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the baseline SOE variables as well as one of the ideational markers (Models 2–5 in Table 1). We find
that party-based populism, euroskepticism and extremism do not have statistically significant
effects on electoral performance in EP elections when incumbency, party size and the electoral
cycle are controlled for. Our results, thus, do not lend support to Hypotheses 5–7.
Next, we turn to assess Hypothesis 4 which posits that the effects of incumbency, size and
cycle do not vary across ideational party characteristics, as well as the related hypothesis that
the effect of party ideology is stable across values of the SOE variables (Hypothesis 8). We esti-
mate a series of regression models that interact incumbency, size and cycle with PEES, our
umbrella category for populists, extremists and euroskeptics (Table A2 in Appendix). The effect
of the interaction term between the PEES dummy and incumbency status is positive but not stat-
istically significant (Model 2 in Table A2 in Appendix). When we repeat the analysis for populist,
extremist and euroskeptic parties separately (Table A3 in Appendix), we find statistically signifi-
cant positive effects for interaction terms between populism and incumbency as well as a far-right
ideology and incumbency (Figure 2). In other words, populist and far-right parties in government
did significantly better in EP elections relative to preceding national elections, compared to popu-
list and far-right parties in opposition. For parties that are not populist or far-right, electoral suc-
cess did not depend on incumbency status. These results challenge the expectation that the effect
of party ideology is stable across SOE variables and vice versa (Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 8).
Party size affects the electoral performance of PEES and non-PEES parties in a roughly similar
manner, as the respective interaction term is not statistically significant (Model 3 in Table A2 in
Appendix). When repeating the analysis for populist, right-wing and left-wing extremist and
euroskeptic parties separately (Table A4 in Appendix), however, we find that interaction terms
for populism and party size and for far-right ideology and party size have statistically significant
positive effects (Figure 3). The negative effect of party size on electoral performance is much
weaker for populist parties than for other parties. Among far-right parties, party size is associated
with an increased vote share in EP elections – a finding that defies the second-order logic. These
results suggest that second-order effects are not stable across party ideologies, challenging
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 8.
Finally, we test the proposition that cycle effects are independent of party ideational character-
istics. To test this, we estimate a model (Model 4 in Table A2 in Appendix) with a three-way
interaction between incumbency, PEES status and the electoral cycle. The results indicate that
while government parties score a little lower on the dependent variable, their electoral
Figure 1. Effects of party size on
electoral performance in 2019 EP
elections, by national electoral sys-
tem.
Notes: Entries are average marginal
effects with 95% confidence intervals.
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performance is not statistically different from that of opposition parties. These tendencies do not
vary across the electoral cycle, as the SOE model would suggest, nor across party ideologies (see
also Table 2b in Online Appendix). This is in line with Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 8.
In sum, our results lend clear and consistent support to Hypothesis 2 which posits that party
size is negatively associated with electoral gains in EP elections. The effect of size is remarkably
stable across our models. The negative effect of party size is particularly pronounced in countries
where national legislatures are elected under a plurality or mixed electoral system (Hypothesis
2a). We find no support to the proposition at the core of the SOE theory according to which gov-
ernment parties lose votes in EP elections. This does not allow us to confirm Hypothesis
1. Hypothesis 3 is also not confirmed because our analysis did not reveal any electoral cycle
effects. Our analysis yields mixed results with regard to the effects of party ideology. While party-
based populism, extremism and euroskepticism are not statistically significant predictors of elect-
oral performance in EP elections when party size, incumbency and cycle are controlled for, party
ideologies appear to moderate second-order effects. Specifically, incumbency and party size
effects on electoral success seem to be moderated by populism and right-wing extremism.
These results do not allow us to confirm either the hypotheses positing ideological effects
(Hypotheses 5–7) or the expectation that SOE effects are stable across party ideologies and
vice versa (Hypothesis 4, Hypothesis 8).
Figure 2. Effects of incumbency on electoral performance in 2019 EP elections, by party ideology.
Notes: Entries are average adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3. Effects of party size on electoral performance in 2019 EP elections, by party ideology.
Notes: Entries are average adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals.
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Discussion
This article set out to explore the question of whether EP elections can still be characterized as
second-order national contests in the context of the growing prominence of populist, euroskeptic
and extremist challenges to liberal-democratic Europeanism. While the symptoms of the
second-order nature of EP elections have been firmly established in the literature, determining
what kind of aggregate-level electoral outcomes would challenge the second-order theory
required more effort. Demonstrating that European issues play a significant role in EP elections
does not constitute a sufficient basis for rejecting the claim that EP elections are second-order
contests – unless it is shown that European issues did not matter in preceding first-order elec-
tions. In other words, the SOE theory expects EP elections to echo national elections, regardless
of what issues were or were not salient in these elections. If the politicization of European inte-
gration occurs, above all, on the national arena, and is driven by national political actors, as the
politicization literature unequivocally argues, EP elections may well remain second-order even if
they have ‘European content’. Refuting the second-order argument thus requires demonstrating
that EP elections do not simply mirror the political realities of the first-order elections but con-
stitute, at least to an extent, a sui generis arena for political contestation. Such an assertion calls
for demonstrating that aggregate outcomes of EP elections cannot be reduced to a combination of
party performance in first-order elections and the erosion of incumbent support as a function of
‘political time’. A finding that there are EU-wide swings in electoral support for groups of parties
distinguished by ideational characteristics would lend tentative support to the sui generis
argument.
This article tested the ideal-typical second-order and sui generis models of EP elections with
party-level data from the 2019 EP elections as well as preceding national elections. Our empirical
test focused on establishing the importance of second-order effects (incumbency, party size and
the electoral cycle) as well as ideational party characteristics (populism, extremism and euroskep-
ticism) in driving differences in party vote shares across the two elections. Our results challenge
the second-order theory in that we find no evidence of incumbency or electoral cycle effects: in
the 2019 EP contests, voters across Europe did not appear to punish political incumbents, irre-
spective of the timing of the EP election in the national electoral cycle. Our findings, however,
corroborate the expectation, central to the SOE approach, that party size is negatively associated
with electoral performance in European elections compared to preceding national elections. The
fact that this finding is robust across different operationalizations of the dependent variable sug-
gests that the negative effect of party size is substantive rather than just mechanical. Finally, this
study went beyond conventional tests of the SOE model by demonstrating that the effect of party
size on electoral performance varies systematically across electoral systems, with large parties los-
ing more votes in countries where national elections are held under plurality or mixed systems as
opposed to proportional representation. The robustness of this effect strongly suggests that future
tests of the second-order model that measure electoral performance in terms of difference in
party vote shares across national and EP elections should control for electoral system effects.
Our results do not support the conjecture that electoral gains and losses in EP elections are
driven by ideational party characteristics. While populists, extremists and euroskeptics, on aver-
age, lost votes compared to preceding national elections, party ideologies did not systematically
predict electoral performance when conventional second-order variables were controlled for.
These results challenge the proposition that EP elections constitute a privileged arena on
which the conflict between the liberal-democratic pro-integrationist mainstream and a
populist-extremist-euroskeptic opposition is played out. Instead, these findings appear to be
more consistent with the argument, central to the politicization literature, that conflict over
European integration is articulated and waged, above all, on the national political arena.
However, our results suggest that party ideologies matter because they moderate the effects of
party size and incumbency on party performance in EP elections. The finding that large populist
12 Piret Ehin and Liisa Talving
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parties lose, on average, a smaller share of the vote than large non-populist parties, while among
far-right parties, party size is positively associated with electoral gains, challenges the
second-order model. These findings imply that the voters of populist and far-right parties are,
for whatever reason, less affected or unaffected by the prevalent impulse to abandon large parties
in EP elections. They also suggest that the shift of populist and far-right actors from the fringes of
national politics to the mainstream and from opposition to government, if continued, is likely to
have significant implications for the composition of the European Parliament and possibly for the
future of European integration. Thus, it appears that one cannot count on the party size effect –
the only mechanism of second-order model that systematically worked in 2019 according to our
results – to serve as a check on the rise of populists and right-wing extremists.
Our results point to four promising directions for future research on European elections. First,
they suggest that such research should pay closer attention to how differences in electoral system
design, both across countries and across different types of elections, influence voter behavior and
the fortunes of political parties. In doing so, future studies should take into account both mech-
anical as well as psychological effects of electoral systems. Second, more research is needed to
understand the causes of vote fragmentation which this and other studies have identified as
the dominant trend in the 2019 European elections. While voters across Europe challenged
the political status quo by abandoning parties they voted for in national elections, there appears
to be no single explanation for why they did so. Overall, fragmentation of the vote with no single
underlying driver is consistent with the literature that emphasizes the heterogeneity of voters,
motives and contexts in a complex multi-level political system (Hooghe and Marks, 2009).
However, the loss of structure may also be interpreted as being consistent with the notion of sin-
cere voting, associated with the second-order thesis. Third, aggregate-level tests of the proposition
that EP elections are sui generis, with vote driven by different factors than in national elections,
are limited in many ways, notably by their inability to rule out ‘time effects’ that may lead voters
to change their preferences. Case studies focusing on countries that have held national and EP
elections on the same day or in close temporal proximity to one another, along with studies
employing survey data about vote intention in hypothetical simultaneous elections, could cast
more light on the issue. Finally, our results point to the need to better understand the role of
party ideologies and ideological conflicts in EP elections. Instead of regarding the SOE model
and ideational explanations as contending alternatives, future studies may want to examine
whether, how and with what consequences ideologies and second-order effects interact. Such
an agenda appears promising, given that both the SOE model and the expanding body of knowl-
edge on populism, extremism and euroskepticism share a common focus on popular discontent
and its electoral manifestations.
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Appendix
Table A1. Predictive margins for party size
Smallest party 2.05***
(0.63)
Largest party −11.35***
(1.84)
Smallest party in PR system 1.78**
(0.69)
Largest party in PR system −9.60***
(2.04)
Smallest party in non-PR system 3.33**
(1.42)
Largest party in non-PR system −20.5***
(3.56)
Notes: Entries are predictive margins, i.e. average values of Y at specified values of X, calculated based on multi-level regression models.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10.
Table A2. Effects of incumbency, party size and electoral cycle on electoral performance in 2019 EP elections, by party
ideology
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Incumbent 3.39
(2.40)
3.05
(2.41)
3.34
(2.40)
2.87
(2.61)
Party size −0.43***
(0.08)
−0.46***
(0.09)
−0.47***
(0.10)
−0.47***
(0.09)
Cycle 0.02
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.05
(0.07)
Cycle2 −0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent # Cycle −0.16
(0.11)
−0.17
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
−0.19
(0.12)
Incumbent # Cycle2 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
PR system −1.93
(1.68)
−2.04
(1.67)
−2.18
(1.70)
−2.23
(1.68)
Party size # PR system 0.22**
(0.09)
0.23**
(0.09)
0.24**
|(0.10)
0.25***
(0.10)
PEES −1.81**
(0.88)
−2.41**
|(1.01)
−2.83*
(1.44)
−1.61
(3.02)
PEES # Incumbent – 2.65
(2.13)
– 4.87
(7.13)
PEES # Party size – – 0.08
(0.09)
–
PEES # Cycle – – – −0.10
(0.13)
PEES # Cycle2 – – – 0.00
(0.00)
PEES # Cycle # Incumbent – – – 0.01
(0.33)
PEES # Cycle2 # Incumbent – – – −0.00
(0.00)
Constant 4.58**
(2.11)
4.96**
(2.12)
5.06**
(2.17)
4.82**
(2.28)
Observations 192 192 192 192
Groups 28 28 28 28
Log Likelihood −601.6 −600.9 −601.2 −599.7
Notes: Entries are coefficients from multi-level regression models with standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10.
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Table A3. Interaction effects of incumbency and party ideology on electoral performance in 2019 EP elections
Populist Far-right Far-left Euroskeptic
Incumbent 2.99
(2.39)
2.67
(2.39)
3.30
(2.42)
2.98
(2.43)
Party size −0.47***
(0.08)
−0.49***
(0.08)
−0.45***
(0.08)
−0.46***
(0.09)
Cycle 0.03
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
Cycle2 −0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent # Cycle −0.18
(0.11)
−0.14
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
Incumbent # Cycle2 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.0
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
PR system −2.23
(1.66)
−2.11
(1.66)
−2.05
(1.68)
−1.87
(1.68)
Party size # PR system 0.24***
(0.09)
0.27***
(0.09)
0.24***
(0.09)
0.24**
(0.09)
Populist −3.15***
(1.17)
– – –
Far-right – −1.11
(1.43)
– –
Far-left – – −1.90
(1.33)
–
Euroskeptic – – – −2.19**
(1.04)
Populist # Incumbent 5.32**
(2.17)
– – –
Far-right # Incumbent – 8.05***
(2.81)
– –
Far-left # Incumbent – – −3.87
(6.00)
–
Euroskeptic # Incumbent – – – 3.24
(2.48)
Constant 4.98**
(2.09)
4.60**
(2.08)
4.63**
(2.13)
4.72**
(2.12)
Observations 192 192 192 192
Groups 28 28 28 28
Log Likelihood −599.4 −599.4 −602.2 −601.4
Notes: Entries are coefficients from multi-level regression models with standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10.
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Table A4. Interaction effects of party size and ideology on electoral performance in 2019 EP elections
Populist Far-right Far-left Eursoskeptic
Incumbent 3.57
(2.37)
3.30
(2.36)
3.27
(2.42)
3.30
(2.41)
Party size −0.52***
(0.09)
−0.55***
(0.09)
−0.45***
(0.08)
−0.48***
(0.10)
Cycle 0.03
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
Cycle2 −0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
−0.00
(0.00)
Incumbent # Cycle −0.17
(0.11)
−0.14
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
−0.16
(0.11)
Incumbent # Cycle2 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
PR system −2.60
(1.67)
−2.52
(1.65)
−1.97
(1.68)
−2.05
(1.71)
Party size # PR system 0.28***
(0.09)
0.31***
(0.09)
0.24***
(0.09)
0.25**
(0.10)
Populist −5.30***
(1.72)
– – –
Far-right – −4.31**
(2.03)
– –
Far-left – – −1.70
(2.15)
–
Euroskeptic – – – −2.95*
(1.51)
Populist # Party size 0.24***
(0.09)
– – –
Far-right # Party size – 0.36***
(0.11)
– –
Far-left # Party size – – −0.04
(0.17)
–
Euroskeptic # Party size – – – 0.11
(0.09)
Constant 5.34**
(2.11)
5.04**
(2.08)
4.61**
(2.15)
4.90**
(2.16)
Observations 192 192 192 192
Groups 28 28 28 28
Log Likelihood −599.1 −598.2 −602.4 −601.6
Notes: Entries are coefficients from multi-level regression models with standard errors in parentheses. *** P < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.10.
Cite this article: Ehin P, Talving L (2020). Second-order effects or ideational rifts? Explaining outcomes of European elec-
tions in an era of populist politics. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 1–18. https://doi.org/
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